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“Black Elk mourned that a dream died in the snow at Wounded
Knee. It is up to us to do the next thing: to dream a new one . . . .
It is not about the heart that was buried in the cold ground of South
Dakota but rather about the heart that beats on—among the
Dakota, to be sure, but also among the Diné, Comanche, Ojibwe,
Seminole, Miwok, Blackfeet, and the other tribes around the
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country.” 1
When the coronavirus pandemic swept across the country, it hit
communities of color disproportionately hard. 2 American Indians 3 were
no exception. 4 According to the U.S. Centers for Disease Control and
Prevention, Covid-19 infected American Indians and Alaskan Natives at a
rate 3.5 times that of their Caucasian counterparts. 5 These communities
Copyright 2022, by BEN REITER.
* Ben Reiter is an associate attorney in the Project Finance and Public
Finance practice group of Nixon Peabody LLP in Washington, D.C. and a 2020
Clean Energy Leadership Institute Fellow. His practice focuses on federal energy
regulation and infrastructure development. He would like to thank Kim Cannon
for introducing him to the practice of Indian law and the legal issues associated
with tribal energy development. The opinions expressed in this Article are solely
those of the author and do not necessarily reflect those of his employer. All errors
are the author’s own.
1. DAVID TREUER, THE HEARTBEAT OF WOUNDED KNEE: NATIVE AMERICA
FROM 1890 TO THE PRESENT 452–53 (2019).
2. See Maria Godoy & Daniel Wood, What Do Coronavirus Racial
Disparities Look Like by State?, NPR (May 30, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.
npr.org/sections/health-shots/2020/05/30/865413079/what-do-coronavirus-racial
-disparities-look-like-state-by-state [https://perma.cc/9SHH-GZ55].
3. This Article generally uses the U.S.-census-defined term “American
Indian” as is consistent with the usage by the Native American Rights Fund,
National Congress of American Indians, and National Museum of the American
Indian. Mission & History, NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, https://www.ncai.org/
about-ncai/mission-history [https://perma.cc/34LQ-58ZT] (last visited Oct. 31,
2021); Frequently Asked Questions, NATIVE AM. RIGHTS FUND, https://www
.narf.org/frequently-asked-questions/ [https://perma.cc/7UVY-3K52] (last visited
Oct. 31, 2021); FAQ: Teaching & Learning About Native Amercans, NAT’L
MUSEUM AM. INDIAN, https://americanindian.si.edu/nk360/faq/did-you-know
[https://perma.cc/9LAC-4B57] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021). However, the Article
occasionally uses terms such as “Native American” or “Indian” when such use
would be consistent with the way individuals or tribes refer to themselves or when
such use would be consistent with statutory or regulatory text.
4. Lizzie Wade, COVID-19 Data on Native Americans Is ‘a National
Disgrace.’ This Scientist Is Fighting to be Counted, SCIENCE (Sept. 24, 2020),
https://www.sciencemag.org/news/2020/09/covid-19-data-native-americans-nat
ional-disgrace-scientist-fighting-be-counted
[https://perma.cc/CR9T-BJHN]
(“The virus has taken a disproportionate toll on many Indigenous communities in
the United States.”).
5. Jacqueline Howard, Covid-19 Incidence More Than Triple Among Native
Americans, New CDC Report Says, CNN (Aug. 21, 2020, 11:00 AM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/08/21/health/covid-19-native-americans-cdc-studywellness/index.html [https://perma.cc/5WF2-JCW2].
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were also four times more likely to be hospitalized and 2.6 times more
likely to die from Covid-19. 6 At an early point in the pandemic—May 18,
2020—the Navajo Nation had the highest per capita infection rate in the
country. 7 By that same date, American Indians living in Wyoming
accounted for more than 30% of the state’s positive Covid-19 tests and
over half of the Covid-19 related deaths, despite making up only 3% of the
state’s population. 8 In New Mexico, although constituting only 9% of the
population, American Indians accounted for 60% of the state’s Covid-19
cases. 9 In fact, early in the pandemic, “[i]f Native American tribes were
counted as states, the five most infected states in the country would all be
native tribes.” 10

6. Risk for COVID-19 Infection, Hospitalization, and Death by
Race/Ethnicity, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, https://www.cdc
.gov/coronavirus/2019-ncov/covid-data/investigations-discovery/hospitalizationdeath-by-race-ethnicity.html [https://perma.cc/PE95-HL2R] (last updated Mar.
25, 2022).
7. Hollie Silverman et al., Navajo Nation Surpasses New York State for the
Highest Covid-19 Infection Rate in the US, CNN (May 18, 2020, 5:55 PM),
https://www.cnn.com/2020/05/18/us/navajo-nation-infection-rate-trnd/index.ht
ml [https://perma.cc/D39B-D9YL].
8. Savannah Maher, Northern Arapaho Tribe Loses Fifth Member to
COVID-19, WYO. PUB. MEDIA (May 18, 2020, 4:28 PM), https://www.wyom
ingpublicmedia.org/post/northern-arapaho-tribe-loses-fifth-member-covid-19
[https://perma.cc/L86Q-AL34].
9. Godoy & Wood, supra note 2.
10. Nicholas Kristof, The Top U.S. Coronavirus Hot Spots Are All Indian
Lands, N.Y. TIMES (May 30, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/30/
opinion/sunday/coronavirus-native-americans.html [https://perma.cc/AV9S-Q7
GY]. The pandemic has also compounded existing economic problems on Indian
reservations as tribes have been forced to shutter key revenue generators such as
casinos, festivals, business incubators, and other attractions. Liz Mineo, For
Native Americans, COVID-19 Is ‘The Worst of Both Worlds at the Same Time’,
HARV. GAZETTE (May 8, 2020), https://news.harvard.edu/gazette/story/2020
/05/the-impact-of-covid-19-on-native-american-communities/ [https://perma.cc/
H54E-5NAR]; Simon Romero & Jack Healy, Tribal Nations Face Most Severe
Crisis in Decades as the Coronavirus Closes Casinos, N.Y. TIMES (May 13,
2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/11/us/coronavirus-native-americansindian-country.html [https://perma.cc/LQR5-WVN9]. As a result, according to
Joseph Kalt, co-director of the Harvard Project on American Indian Economic
Development at the Kennedy School’s Ash Center for Democratic Governance
and Innovation, “Native American tribes’ tax base have been cut literally to zero,
and tribal governments don’t have money to run the health clinic or child
protection services.” Mineo, supra note 10.
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While there are numerous and complex reasons that contributed to the
disproportionate initial impact of Covid-19 on American Indian
communities, public health experts have consistently identified one issue
as significantly exacerbating the problem. The United States (“U.S.”)
government has chronically failed to provide adequate healthcare to
American Indian communities. 11 Despite treaty obligations requiring the
U.S. government to provide healthcare to American Indians, 12 it has
consistently failed to meet those obligations. 13 For example, according to
a 2018 report from the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights, “[i]n 2016, IHS
11. See, e.g., Arnav Shah et al., The Challenge of COVID-19 and American
Indian Health, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Aug. 12, 2020), https://www.com
monwealthfund.org/blog/2020/challenge-covid-19-and-american-indian-health
[https://perma.cc/2ZD6-P4F9] (“The impact of COVID-19 on American Indian
communities is amplified by crowded housing, understaffed hospitals, lack of
running water, and limited internet access. These problems date back to the U.S.
government’s failure to comply with historical treaty obligations to fund basic
services in exchange for tribal land. American Indians have worse access to care
and experience poorer health status compared with the general U.S. population.”);
Mark Walker, Pandemic Highlights Deep-Rooted Problems in Indian Health
Service, N.Y. TIMES (Oct. 8, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/09/29/us/
politics/coronavirus-indian-health-service.html [https://perma.cc/87CS-YQDW];
Nora Mabie, Native American Tribes Have Been Hit Harder by COVID-19.
Here’s Why., GREAT FALL TRIB. (Aug. 5, 2020, 6:00 AM), https://www.great
fallstribune.com/story/news/2020/08/05/why-native-americans-impacted-hardercovid-19-montana-united-states/5573737002/ [https://perma.cc/8XYH-C98Q]
(“Rather, they are a product of long-term disinvestment, the consequences of
which transcend generations.”).
12. See Basis for Health Services, INDIAN HEALTH SERV., https://www.ihs.
gov/newsroom/factsheets/basisforhealthservices/ [https://perma.cc/GEA4-FD6L]
(last visited Oct. 31, 2021) (“Treaties between the United States Government and
Indian Tribes frequently call for the provision of medical services, the services of
physicians, or the provision of hospitals for the care of Indian people.”).
13. See U.S. COMM’N ON CIVIL RIGHTS, BROKEN PROMISES: CONTINUING
FEDERAL FUNDING SHORTFALL FOR NATIVE AMERICANS (2018), https://www.
usccr.gov/pubs/2018/12-20-Broken-Promises.pdf [https://perma.cc/TD26-WB
UT] (“In exchange for the surrender and reduction of tribal lands and removal and
resettlement of approximately one-fifth of Native American tribes from their
original lands, the United States signed 375 treaties, passed laws, and instituted
policies that shape and define the special government-to-government relationship
between federal and tribal governments. Yet the U.S. government forced many
Native Americans to give up their culture and, throughout the history of this
relationship, has not provided adequate assistance to support Native American
interconnected infrastructure, self-governance, housing, education, health, and
economic development needs.”).
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health care expenditures per person were only $2,834, compared to $9,990
per person for federal health care spending nationwide.” 14 As of the 2016
fiscal year, existing American Indian health and sanitation facilities,
including safe drinking water and waste disposal facilities, had an average
age of 47 years and required an excess of $2.1 billion in upgrades. 15 “In
2017, IHS health care expenditures per person were $3,332, compared to
$9,207 for federal health care spending nationwide.” 16
Unfortunately, the government’s failure to meet its basic obligation to
provide healthcare to American Indian communities only continued with
the onset of the Covid-19 pandemic. The Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and
Economic Security Act (the “CARES Act”), signed into law on March 27,
2020, allocated $8 billion in relief funds to Tribal governments. 17 While
the $70 billion sent to non-Tribal hospitals and healthcare providers were
dispersed almost immediately in early April, Tribes did not begin to
receive their respective funds until May. 18 Even when the CARES Act
funds finally arrived, Covid-19 testing kits and personal protective
equipment (“PPE”) were often not included. 19 In one particularly dark

14. Id. at 66.
15. Id. at 86. The $2.1 billion has never been appropriated. See id.
16. Id. at 66–67.
17. Shah et al., supra note 11.
18. Id.; Sahir Doshi et al., The COVID-19 Response in Indian Country, CTR.
FOR AM. PROGRESS (June 18, 2020, 9:08 AM), https://www.american
progress.org/issues/green/reports/2020/06/18/486480/covid-19-response-indiancountry/ [https://perma.cc/Q4NS-K6HA] (“For example, bureaucratic holdups at
the Treasury Department have denied tribes access to the full $8 billion promised
to them in the Coronavirus Aid, Relief, and Economic Security (CARES) Act.
The Treasury, with little experience with tribes and underfunded and
dysfunctional tribal relations infrastructure, did not disburse any federal dollars
until well after Congress’ deadline. The allocation formula was flawed and
ignored the forms it had previously forced tribes to submit in April—to disburse
only $4.8 billion. Data leaks, legal challenges, and inexcusable delays have
marred the entire process, forcing tribes to spend money that they don’t have to
run basic services.”).
19. Doshi et al., supra note 18 (“Federal assistance during the pandemic has
not been forthcoming; the Sault Ste. Marie Tribe of Chippewa Indians, for
example, received only two test kits for a tribe of 44,000 people. The Oyate Health
Center, a major health provider in Rapid City, South Dakota, which transitioned
into tribal management in 2019, received almost no tests, PPE, or cleaning
supplies.”).
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example, the Seattle Indian Health Board received only body bags after
appealing for medical supplies. 20
Although the U.S. government’s failure to live up to its healthcare
treaty obligations has had stark effects on the lives of American Indians
during the pandemic, this failure is unfortunately not limited to the
government’s healthcare obligations. Historically, the U.S. government
has also failed to fulfill its treaty obligations in other aspects, such as
providing education 21 and housing 22 and investigating and preventing the
continuous waves of missing American Indian women. 23 Further, the
federal government has also presided over a generally disastrous
20. Erik Ortiz, Native American Health Center Asked for COVID-19
Supplies. It Got Body Bags Instead., NBC NEWS (May 6, 2020, 7:21 AM),
https://www.nbcnews.com/news/us-news/native-american-health-center-askedcovid-19-supplies-they-got-n1200246 [https://perma.cc/7R32-YLPW].
21. Denise Juneau, The Bureau of Indian Education Is Broken,
EDUCATIONWEEK (Feb. 6, 2018), https://www.edweek.org/leadership/opinionthe-bureau-of-indian-education-is-broken/2018/02 [https://perma.cc/GXC8-4P
NV] (“For over a century, the federal government has proven that attempting to
control and oversee a nationwide network of schools leads to an ineffective and
disheartening system of education that fails to address the cultural, linguistic, and
overall learning needs of American Indian children. If the BIE’s record of failure
reflected on any other group of students, there would be a national outcry.”);
NAT’L COUNCIL ON INDIAN EDUC., ANNUAL REPORT TO CONGRESS 3 (2016),
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/oese/oie/nacieannrpt2016.pdf
[https://perma.cc/GCT2-RGAG] (“The historical underfunding of Title VI has
hindered the quantity and quality of culturally responsive services that can be
provided to Native students and has limited the achievement gains that can be
realized.”).
22. U.S. DEP’T HOUS. & URB. DEV., FISCAL YEAR 2017: CONGRESSIONAL
JUSTIFICATIONS 11-2 (2017), https://www.hud.gov/sites/documents/FY_2017
_CJS_COMBINED.PDF [https://perma.cc/F5EK-DVHN] (“The lack of housing
and infrastructure in Indian Country is severe and widespread, and far exceeds the
funding currently provided to tribes.”).
23. Acee Agoyo, Trump Administration Faulted for Efforts to Address
‘Epidemic’ of Missing and Murdered in Indian Country, INDIANZ.COM (Feb. 10,
2020), https://www.indianz.com/News/2020/02/10/trump-administration-faulted
-for-efforts.asp [https://perma.cc/GF64-6MLC]; SIHB Staff, Savanna’s Act and
the Not Invisible Act: Addressing the Epidemic of Missing and Murdered
Indigenous People, SEATTLE INDIAN HEALTH BD. (Oct. 13, 2020), https://
www.sihb.org/2020/10/savannas-act-and-the-not-invisible-act-addressing-the-ep
idemic-of-missing-and-murdered-indigenous-people/ [https://perma.cc/98FV-V
APH] (“Centuries of institutional and structural racism, systemic oppression, and
the chronic underfunding of trust and treaty obligations have all allowed for the
exacerbation of the MMIP crisis.”).
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development of energy resources located on tribal land 24—the focus of
this Article. 25
The U.S. government holds approximately 56.2 million acres of land
in trust 26 for American Indians and their Tribes.27 This property—although
only representing a sliver of the land possessed by American Indians prior
to the 1800s 28—is extraordinarily rich with traditional natural resources
such as coal, oil, and gas. 29 Indian reservations contain 30% of the nation’s
coal reserves west of the Mississippi, 50% of potential uranium reserves,
and 20% of known oil and gas reserves. 30 Yet, of the 56.2 million acres,
only 2.1 million have been developed as an energy resource 31—most often
by non-American-Indian entities—leaving 86% of Tribal land with energy
resources undeveloped. 32

24. Consistent with the Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act, when referring to “tribal land,” this Article references “any
land or interests in land owned by any Indian tribe, title to which is held in trust
by the United States, or is subject to a restriction against alienation under laws of
the United States.” 25 U.S.C § 3501(13).
25. See, e.g., U.S. GOV’T ACCOUNTABILITY OFF., GAO-15-502, INDIAN
ENERGY DEVELOPMENT: POOR MANAGEMENT BY BIA HAS HINDERED ENERGY
DEVELOPMENT ON INDIAN LANDS 2 (2015) [hereinafter 2015 GAO REPORT],
https://www.gao.gov/assets/680/670701.pdf
[https://perma.cc/BMY9-JXWZ]
(“However, even with considerable energy resources, according to a 2014 Interior
document, Indian energy resources are underdeveloped relative to surrounding
non-Indian resources.”).
26. “The federal Indian trust responsibility is a legal obligation under which
the United States ‘has charged itself with moral obligations of the highest
responsibility and trust’ toward Indian tribes (Seminole Nation v. United States,
1942).” Frequently Asked Questions, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, INDIAN AFFS.,
https://www.bia.gov/frequently-asked-questions [https:// perma.cc/E56G-7PTZ]
(last visited Nov. 1, 2021).
27. Id.; OFF. INDIAN ENERGY, U.S. DEP’T ENERGY, DOE INDIAN ENERGY
PROGRAM OVERVIEW 6 (2018) [hereinafter INDIAN ENERGY PROGRAM],
https://www.energy.gov/sites/prod/files/2018/12/f58/1-indian-energy-overview.
pdf [https://perma.cc/K9MN-L4VJ].
28. Rebecca Onion & Claudio Saunt, Interactive Time-Lapse Map Shows
How the U.S. Took More Than 1.5 Billion Acres from Native Americans, SLATE
(June 17, 2014), http://www.slate.com/blogs/the_vault/2014/06/17/interactive
_map_loss_of_indian_land.html [https://perma.cc/M3KM-UEDF].
29. See INDIAN ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 6.
30. Id.; Shawn E. Regan & Terry L. Anderson, The Energy Wealth of Indian
Nations, 3 LSU J. ENERGY L. & RESOURCES 195, 196 (2014).
31. INDIAN ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 6.
32. Id.
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Development of these resources has often led to environmental
damage or unfunded clean-up obligations—the sort that often accompany
traditional extractive industries. 33 For example, a shut-in oil well owned
by Anadarko Minerals, Inc. leaked 600 barrels of crude oil and 90,000
barrels of brine onto the Fort Peck Indian reservation in April 2017. 34 In
2013, a pipeline owned by Phillips 66 broke open for the third time,
spilling approximately 25,000 gallons of gasoline onto Crow Tribal
members’ property. 35 The Zortman-Landusky hardrock mine—located
just south of the Fort Belknap Indian reservation in northern Montana—
killed off trout in nearby streams, and the company responsible for the
nearly $100 million cleanup has long since ceased to exist. 36 The now
bankrupt Cloud Peak Energy, Inc. attempted to solicit the consent of a
Crow Tribal family for excavating an open-pit coal mine on property that
had been in the family for 150 years. 37
Given these environmental issues, it is understandable—perhaps even
reasonable—to oppose energy development on Tribal lands. However, not
33. See, e.g., TREUER, supra note 1, at 436 (“The construction of the dam at
the confluence of the Cannonball and Missouri rivers that created Lake Oahe in
1962 completely submerged historical Mandan and Hidatsa sites, for example.
Uranium and coal mining on the Navajo lands has had crushing environmental
impacts in the Southwest. Northern Minnesota reservations were completely
deforested in the early 1900s to feed the needs of growing urban centers like
Minneapolis and Chicago.”); Johnnye Lewis et al., Mining and Environmental
Health Disparities in Native American Communities, 4 CURRENT ENV’T HEALTH
REPS. 130, 132 (2017), https://www.ncbi.nlm.nih.gov/pmc/articles/PMC5429
369/ [https://perma.cc/43VT-HATP] (“The location of abandoned mines within
tribal watersheds and the lack of environmental protections in the 1872 Mining
Law has left a legacy for exposure not only through direct contamination of tribal
lands, but through continuing drainage of contaminated mine water.”).
34. Brett French, Oil Spill Blackens Portion of Fort Peck Reservation,
BILLINGS GAZETTE (May 4, 2018), https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-andregional/montana/oil-spill-blackens-portion-of-fort-peck-reservation/article_f7a
3daa1-7b8c-5099-85d2-a3251053c1c7.html [https://perma.cc/BG9N-5545].
35. Shifting Land Blamed in Crow Reservation Gas Spill, BILLINGS GAZETTE
(July 12, 2013), https://billingsgazette.com/news/state-and-regional/montana/
shifting-land-blamed-in-crow-reservation-gas-spill/article_c2830178-86b3-548b
-9f0b-b82a621d0ad9.html [https://perma.cc/D82B-QUAR].
36. Mark Olalde, Mining Companies Pollute Waterways. Citizens Pay., HIGH
COUNTRY NEWS (Mar. 18, 2019), https://www.hcn.org/articles/climate-deskmining-companies-pollute-western-waters-citizen-pay-for-the-clean-up [https://
perma.cc/47B2-HJL2].
37. Andrew Graham, A Coal Fight in Indian Country Turns Ugly, WYOFILE
(Oct. 2, 2018), https://www.wyofile.com/a-coal-fight-in-indian-country-turnsugly/ [https://perma.cc/7ECM-CQYN].
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all energy development involves the environmental degradation that often
accompanies oil, gas, coal, uranium, and other extractive fuel sources.
Renewable energy projects like solar and wind—while having some
environmental impacts—are substantially less damaging to the
environment and communities they impact. 38 Further, Indian Country is
also rich in renewable energy potential. 39 In the lower 48 states, Tribal
lands contain 17.6 Terawatt-hours (“TWh”) of solar capacity 40 and 2.4
TWh of wind capacity. 41 The U.S. Department of Energy (DOE) estimates
these resources constitute 6.5% of the total utility-scale renewable energy
technical potential in the U.S., and the Bureau of Indian Affairs (BIA)
believes Tribal lands have the potential to supply up to 10% of the
country’s energy supply. 42 Given that some studies estimate in order to
achieve net zero emissions by 2050 the country would need to build
enough solar and wind arrays to cover both Wyoming and Colorado, 43
renewable resources located on the 56.2 million acres of Tribal trust lands
are a vital and untapped asset in the transition to renewable energy.
Despite the availability of these resources and the country’s increasing
reliance on renewable energy, 44 only a handful of wind and solar projects
have been developed on Tribal lands. 45 While numerous reasons are cited
38. Environmental Impacts of Renewable Energy Technologies, UNION
CONCERNED SCIS. (Mar. 5, 2013), https://www.ucsusa.org/resources/environ
mental-impacts-renewable-energy-technologies [https://perma.cc/3X5C-3F7V].
39. See INDIAN ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 7.
40. Silvio Marcacci, Could This New Approach Unlock Gigawatts of Native
American Solar Energy Potential?, FORBES (July 24, 2019, 7:30 AM), https://
www.forbes.com/sites/energyinnovation/2019/06/24/could-this-new-approachunlock-gigawatts-of-native-american-solar-energy-potential/#301d5ea62509
[https://perma.cc/7FF4-JPKU].
41. INDIAN ENERGY PROGRAM, supra note 27, at 7.
42. Id.
43. Brad Plumer, To Cut Emission to Zero, U.S. Needs to Make Big Changes
in Next 10 Years, N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 3, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
12/15/climate/america-next-decade-climate.html [https://perma.cc/A666-52X2]
(“The Princeton study used detailed mapping to see where all those new solar
arrays and wind farms might be located. In one central scenario, they could take
up land area roughly as large as Wyoming and Colorado combined.”).
44. Brad Plumer, In a First, Renewable Energy Is Poised to Eclipse Coal in
U.S., N.Y. TIMES (Nov. 4, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/climate/
coronavirus-coal-electricity-renewables.html [https://perma.cc/YUW9-9GKT].
45. Native American Tribes Pushing into Renewable Energy Development
Across the U.S., INST. FOR ENERGY ECON. & FIN. ANALYSIS (Aug. 29, 2019),
https://ieefa.org/native-american-tribes-pushing-into-renewable-energy-develop
ment-across-the-u-s/ [https://perma.cc/46JJ-5R4M].
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for this lack of development, the federal government is a main contributing
factor. For example, the BIA—which holds the primary authority for
managing energy development on Tribal lands—frequently lacks the
ownership and land use records necessary to approve leases and other
project siting documents. 46 This is despite the fact that the BIA’s own
internal order mandates maintenance of these records. 47 The BIA also does
not track the time taken to review energy-related agreements 48 and its
delayed review times have resulted in the failure of wind projects to ever
come online. 49 The Government Accountability Office (GAO) has also
concluded that many BIA offices simply “do not have staff with the skills
needed to effectively evaluate energy-related documents or adequate staff
resources.” 50 As Wahleah Johns, a member of the Navajo Nation, founder
of Native Renewables, and now Senior Advisor to DOE’s Office of Indian
Energy Policy and Programs, succinctly put it, “treaties and federal
policies dictate how we live and have created red tape that makes it hard
to get things done.” 51
However, the U.S. government’s failure to develop these renewable
energy resources should not—and this Article will argue does not—mean
Tribal lands must sit idle while the rest of the country benefits from
renewable energy projects on lands the U.S. government has taken for

46. Id.
47. See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 18 (“In addition, Interior’s
Secretarial Order 3215 calls for BIA to maintain a system of records that identifies
the location and value of Indian resources and allows for resource owners to
obtain information regarding their assets in a timely manner.”).
48. Id. at 21–23.
49. See id. at 21–22 (“[I]n 2011, the President for the Rosebud Sioux Tribe
in South Dakota, reported that it took 18 months for BIA to review a wind lease.
According to the developer of the project, the review time caused the project to
be delayed and resulted in the project losing an interconnection agreement with
the local utility. Without this agreement, the project has not been able to move
forward, resulting in a loss of revenue for the tribe.”).
50. Id. at 23.
51. Wahleah Johns, A Life on and Off the Navajo Nation, N.Y. TIMES (May
13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/13/opinion/sunday/navajo-nationcoronavirus.html [https://perma.cc/E9T4-HSRB]; see also Elizabeth Ann Kronk
Warner, Tribal Renewable Energy Development Under the HEARTH Act: An
Independently Rational, but Collectively Deficient, Option, 55 ARIZ. L. REV.
1031, 1042 (2013) (“At least one scholar has concluded that many of the obstacles
inherent in the process related to energy development in Indian country are a
direct result of the federal government’s involvement.”).
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itself. 52 The Covid-19 pandemic, in fact, demonstrates that when the
federal government fails to uphold its obligations to American Indians,
they are capable of stepping up to the plate and taking the steps necessary
to protect their communities.
When the pandemic first hit the U.S., Tribes across the country—the
Blackfeet Nation, 53 Cheyenne River Sioux, 54 Mandan Hidatsa and Akira
Nation, 55 Cherokees, 56 Eastern Shoshone and Northern Arapahoe,57 as
well as Navajo 58—to name just a few—imposed stay-at-home orders, set
up roadblocks, established curfews, and instituted mask mandates. 59 In a
few instances, they were forced to defend against state attempts to infringe

52. 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 2 (“However, even with
considerable energy resources, according to a 2014 Interior document, Indian
energy resources are underdeveloped relative to surrounding non-Indian
resources. For example, as of March 2015, the Kumeyaay Wind Facility in
California is the only operating utility-scale wind facility on Indian lands—
another utility-scale wind project is under construction on Indian lands, and one
utility-scale solar project is under construction on Indian lands, according to
Interior officials. In contrast, there has been significant utility-scale wind and solar
generating capacity developed in the United States in the last decade.”).
53. Myers Reece, Blackfeet Tribal Business Council Extends Stay-at-Home
Order, FLATHEAD BEACON (Oct. 13, 2020), https://flatheadbeacon.com/2020/10
/13/blackfeet-tribal-business-council-extends-stay-home-order/ [https://perma.cc
/8TQQ-URFK].
54. Kalen Goodluck, Tribes Defend Themselves Against a Pandemic and
South Dakota’s State Government, HIGH COUNTRY NEWS (Oct. 2, 2020), https://
www.hcn.org/articles/indigenous-affairs-covid19-tribes-defend-themselves-agai
nst-a-pandemic-and-south-dakotas-state-government [https://perma.cc/6BPG-M
CNS].
55. Joe Skurzewski, Three Affiliated Tribes Approves Mask Mandate, KFYR
(Oct. 27, 2020, 10:55 PM), https://www.kfyrtv.com/2020/10/28/three-affiliatedtribes-approves-mask-mandate/.
56. Rex Hodge, Cherokee Tribal Council Unanimously Passes Mask
Mandate, WLOS (Nov. 2, 2020), https://wlos.com/news/local/cherokee-tribalcouncil-crafts-mask-mandate-resolution [https://perma.cc/AD5U-3FDA].
57. Savannah Maher, Wind River Reservation Leaders Ease Some
Restrictions, Implement Mask Mandate, WYO. PUB. MEDIA (Aug. 6, 2020, 3:39
PM), https://www.wyomingpublicmedia.org/post/wind-river-reservation-leaders
-ease-some-restrictions-implement-mask-mandate#stream/0 [https://perma.cc/8P
VL-RKWG].
58. Simon Romero, Checkpoints, Curfews, Airlifts: Virus Rips Through
Navajo Nation, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 20, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/
04/09/us/coronavirus-navajo-nation.html [https://perma.cc/E8LH-QWLS].
59. See supra notes 53–58.
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on their sovereign right to take these essential actions. 60 Public health
experts studying Tribal responses to the pandemic have concluded:
Indigenous nations have reacted quickly and effectively to the
pandemic. In our analysis, tribal nations have implemented
guidelines and policies that appear to be far more effective than
those used by the states they are in. These responses include
locking down roads and implementing guidelines earlier and more
carefully than others and developing relevant modes of delivery
of supplies. Their response shows that Indigenous nations and
communities know what they need; they are the directors of their
own protective measures. 61
After successfully managing their way through the worst of the pandemic,
Tribes were an early leader in Covid-19 vaccine distribution. 62 American
Indians now have the highest Covid-19 vaccination rate in the country. 63
60. Nick Martin, Kristi Noem’s War on Tribal Sovereignty Is Going to Get
People Killed, NEW REPUBLIC (Nov. 17, 2020), https://newrepublic.com/article/
160198/kristi-noems-war-tribal-sovereignty-going-get-people-killed [https://per
ma.cc/B3AS-UFCR] (“As Noem was bragging about getting to breathe on Trump
and throwing her support behind a superspreader event in July, Frazier and the
Cheyenne River Sioux Tribe government established checkpoints along roads
entering the tribe’s reservation to check incoming vehicles to slow the spread of
the virus. The stops were noninvasive and quick-moving, the kind of screening
people face when walking into some restaurants and other shops across the
country. But Noem fought the checkpoints, claiming that the CRST did not have
the jurisdiction to stop traffic.”).
61. Lisa Hardy et al., Tribes Mount Organized Responses to COVID-19, in
Contrast to State and Federal Governments, THE CONVERSATION (Dec. 2, 2020,
8:28 AM), https://theconversation.com/tribes-mount-organized-responses-tocovid-19-in-contrast-to-state-and-federal-governments-150627
[https://perma.cc/Z3AY-CL42] (“[I]n the case of Indigenous nations, the story of
inequity is imbued with dispossession of lands and is met with organizing from
the inside: two crucial points for untangling and responding to COVID-19.”).
62. Joaqlin Estus, Tribes Are Racing Ahead of Vaccination Curve, INDIAN
COUNTRY TODAY (Feb. 16, 2021), https://indiancountrytoday.com/news/tribesare-racing-ahead-of-vaccination-curve-1dw7tULGrE293nE62-rKOg [https://per
ma.cc/JDX3-222C] (“How is the Indian health system doing on vaccine
distribution? ‘We're doing better than most states and counties in the country,’
said Abigail Echo-Hawk, director of the Urban Indian Health Institute in
Seattle.”).
63. Sukee Bennett, American Indians Have the Highest Covid Vaccination
Rate in the US, PBS (July 6, 2021), https://www.pbs.org/wgbh/nova/article/
native-americans-highest-covid-vaccination-rate-us/ [https://perma.cc/3V7J-J4E7].
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In short, Tribal authorities and their citizens responded to the pandemic in
a significantly more effective manner than the federal and state
governments.
A similar story can be told with respect to the development of
renewable energy resources on Tribal lands. Mariah Gladstone, a member
of the Blackfeet and Cherokee tribes, has argued generally, in light of the
pandemic, for the long term: “I think it is essential that [tribal nations]
recognize our own sovereignty and our own ability to assert that
sovereignty.” 64 Wahleah Johns has, with respect to clean energy, more
specifically argued: “Today we don’t need handouts from the U.S.
government. We need investment in building a restorative economy that
is aligned with our traditional values and our relationship with nature.”65
While there are many impediments to Tribal development of their own
renewable energy resources, the U.S. government’s functional control of
those resources and the accompanying bureaucratic red tape poses perhaps
the largest obstacle. Some Tribes have minimized the federal
government’s role in energy development on their lands by adopting their
own leasing regulations and having them approved by the Department of
Interior (DOI) under the Helping Expedite and Advance Responsible
Tribal Home Ownership Act (the “HEARTH Act”). 66 However, the
HEARTH Act is limited to allowing Tribes to adopt regulations
“consistent with” those the federal government has already adopted. 67 It is
also limited to surface leasing authority and cannot ensure that easements
and rights-of-way necessary to connect renewable resources to the grid
will be granted. 68 Further, many of the regulations approved to date do not
64. Clarise Elise Thompson, Why Racial Justice is Climate Justice, FIX SOLS.
LAB (June 4, 2020) https://grist.org/fix/combatting-climate-change-covid-19-andsystemic-injustice-on-the-same-front/ [https://perma.cc/7S9M-6KXQ].
65. Johns, supra note 51.
66. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h); Hearth Act of 2012, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, INDIAN
AFFAIRS, https://www.bia.gov/bia/ots/hearth [https://perma.cc/YD5W-BRYK]
(last visited Nov.. 2, 2021); Stacy Bosshardt et al., Tips for Energy Developers
Seeking to Lease Tribal Lands, LAW360 (May 25, 2021, 6:15 PM), https://
www.law360.com/articles/1387702?scroll=1&related=1 [https://perma.cc/45DC
-43PP].
67. 25 U.S.C. § 415(e)(3).
68. Monte Mills, Beyond a Zero-Sum Federal Trust Responsibility: Lessons
from Federal Indian Energy Policy, 6 AM. INDIAN L.J. 35, 70 (2017) (“Beyond
these limitations, the HEARTH Act does not provide a tribe with comprehensive
authority to pursue energy development, as it addresses only surface leasing
authority and does not allow tribes to approve rights-of-way that might be
necessary and incidental to such surface development.”).
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explicitly allow for wind or solar project leases.69 In short, the HEARTH
Act simply does not provide an adequate pathway for Tribes’
comprehensive management of their own energy resources.
There is, however, another existing law that, if fully utilized, would
provide Tribes with a more comprehensive authority over the development
of their resources, which in turn would allow them to reclaim sovereignty
and spur renewable energy development for the benefit of their
communities. 70 The Indian Tribal Energy Development and SelfDetermination Act (“ITEDSDA”) was initially enacted in 2005 with the
intention of allowing Tribes to bypass the federal government (and its time
and resource consuming processes) and enter into agreements to develop
the tribe’s energy resources on its own terms. 71 As one scholar stated,
“ITEDSDA represents a large step toward the ultimate goal of modern
federal Indian policy: tribal self-determination.” 72 To take full advantage
of ITEDSDA, Tribes must first adopt a Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement (“TERA”) outlining the Tribe’s own requirements and
processes for entering into energy development agreements like leases,
business agreements, and rights-of-way. 73
No Tribe has chosen to adopt a TERA, however. 74 In explanation of
the decision to reject a TERA’s adoption, Tribes have cited the following
reasons: uncertainty regarding the TERA regulations themselves, the
complexity of TERA approval, and the potential costs associated with
assuming the role of the federal government in tribal energy resource
development. 75 However, in December 2018, amendments to ITEDSDA
aimed at reducing TERA requirements and streamlining the TERA

69. Id. at 69 (“Of these tribes, however, as of early 2017, only a few had
regulations approved for wind and solar or solar resource leases.”).
70. Nicholas M. Ravotti, Access to Energy in Indian Country: The
Difficulties of Self-Determination in Renewable Energy Development, 41 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 279, 308 (2017) (“One reason why TERAs are an ideal solution
is that TERAs apply to all energy resource development, whereas previous energy
development statutes are ambiguous as to whether or not they include
development of renewable energy resources.”).
71. Sara C. Bronin, The Promise and Perils of Renewable Energy on Tribal
Lands, 26 TUL. ENVTL. L.J. 221, 231 (2013).
72. Benjamin J. Fosland, A Case of Not-So-Fatal Flaws: Re-Evaluating the
Indian Tribal Energy and Self-Determination Act, 48 IDAHO L. REV. 447, 448
(2012).
73. 25 U.S.C. § 3504.
74. See, e.g., 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 5.
75. Id. at 32–36.
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application process were adopted (the “2018 Amendments”). 76 The DOI’s
final rule implementing the 2018 Amendments was published in
December 2019. 77 While ITEDSDA remains flawed, the recent revisions,
rapid growth of renewable energy development in the U.S., 78 and the
Tribes’ demonstrated independence in managing the Covid-19 pandemic
all render the present as the ideal time for Tribes to reconsider adopting a
TERA.
This Article will address the lack of renewable energy development
on Tribal lands and analyze how Tribes can take advantage of the recent
amendments to ITEDSDA by entering into TERAs to assert sovereignty
over the development of renewable energy resources on their lands. Part I
of this Article will provide a general legal background of the federal
government’s role in the development (or restriction of development) of
energy resources on tribal lands. Part II will discuss ITEDSDA’s statutory
framework, its implementing regulations, and TERA requirements. Part
III will analyze the 2018 Amendments and highlight how they reduce the
burdens of a TERA, providing the best opportunity for Tribes to
comprehensively manage energy resource development on their lands.
Finally, Part IV will argue that (i) the 2018 Amendments, (ii) the lack of
alternative legal options allowing Tribes to comprehensively manage
energy development on their lands, and (iii) Tribes’ demonstrated ability
to address severe challenges as exhibited through their handling of the
Covid-19 pandemic all make the time ripe for Tribes to reconsider taking
control of the development of their own energy resources through the
adoption of a TERA.
I. FEDERAL OVERSIGHT OF TRIBAL LANDS
Since 1790, the U.S. government has, in one way or another, limited
the alienability of Tribal lands, 79 although the degree of that restriction on
American Indians’ development of their lands has varied over time. The
76. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
Amendments of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-325, 132 Stat. 4445.
77. Tribal Energy Resource Agreements, 84 Fed. Reg. 69,602 (Dec. 18,
2019).
78. See U.S. Renewable Energy Consumption Surpasses Coal for the First
Time in Over 130 Years, U.S. ENERGY INFO. ADMIN. (May 28, 2020),
https://www.eia.gov/todayinenergy/detail.php?id=43895#:~:text=Total%20rene
wable%20energy%20consumption%20in,in%20the%20electric%20power%20s
ector [https://perma.cc/F4HS-JZPN].
79. Act of July 22, 1790, § 4, 1 Stat. 137, 138 (confirmed by Johnson v.
M’Intosh, 21 U.S. 543, 568–69 (1823)); 25 U.S.C. § 177.
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earliest limitation was introduced in the 1790 Trade and Intercourse Act,
which prohibited the “purchase, grant, lease, or other conveyance of lands
. . . from any Indian nation or tribe of Indians” unless orchestrated by the
U.S. government. 80 The Trade and Intercourse Act was affirmed in the
early 1800s by the U.S. Supreme Court in a series of decisions—Johnson
v. M’Intosh, 81 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia, 82 and Worcester v. Georgia. 83
Those same decisions also laid the groundwork for the notion that the U.S.
government holds Tribal lands in trust for the benefit of the Tribes. 84 More
specifically, the Court classified Tribes as “domestic dependent nations”
with a relationship to the U.S. that “resemble that of a ward to his
guardian.” 85 The Indian Removal Act of 1830 enhanced the U.S.’
authority over Tribal lands and, in turn, the trust relationship by directing
the President to negotiate the removal of American Indians from the
southeastern part of the country, create reservations west of the Mississippi
river, and renegotiate treaties to provide American Indians with smaller
tracts of lands. 86
In 1887, U.S. policy shifted towards assimilation and gradually
retreated from its trust responsibility when Congress passed the Dawes
General Allotment Act (the “Dawes Act”).87 The Dawes Act divided up
western Tribal lands into 80- or 160-acre parcels and allotted those parcels
to individual Tribal members. 88 American Indians, however, were not able
to transfer the land until 25 years had passed and after receiving a
“competent” determination by the Secretary of DOI (the "Secretary”). 89
Although the Indian Reorganization Act (or Wheeler-Howard Act) of
1934 extended “the existing periods of trust placed upon any Indian lands
and any restriction on alienation,” at the same time it encouraged Tribes
to adopt constitutions and appoint Tribal councils aimed at furthering
Tribal sovereignty. 90 In one of the most significant steps toward promoting
Tribal sovereignty and limiting federal oversight, Congress declared
80. 25 U.S.C. § 177; see also Mills, supra note 68, at 45.
81. 21 U.S. 543.
82. 30 U.S. 1 (1831).
83. 31 U.S. 515 (1832).
84. Mills, supra note 68, at 46.
85. Cherokee Nation, 30 U.S. at 2.
86. Act of May 28, 1830, 4 Stat. 411; see also TANA FITZPATRICK, CONG.
RSCH. SERV, R46647, TRIBAL LAND OWNERSHIP STATUSES: OVERVIEW AND
SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 5 (2021).
87. See Act of February 8, 1887, ch. 119, 24 Stat. 388.
88. Id.
89. Id.
90. Indian Reorganization Act, Pub. L. No. 73-383, 48 Stat. 984 (1934).
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certain specific Tribes would be “freed from Federal supervision and
control” in 1953. 91
Thus, by the mid-1900s, the policy of federal control over Tribal lands
appeared to be in retreat, although the retreat was generally strategic and
“tracked broader federal interests (i.e., protection of minerals for national
benefit, opening lands to non-Indian settlement) without significant
consideration of tribal objectives, including environmental or cultural
concerns.” 92 As David Treuer chronicled in his book, The Heartbeat of
Wounded Knee:
From the beginning, reservations were staffed and administered
by non-Indian agents whose degree of graft and greed was almost
unparalleled in government operations. They gobbled up leases
and sold them to friends and benefactors. They withheld annuity
payments of cloth and food in order to get tribes—nominally
sovereign—to vote the way the government wanted them to vote.
Even in the best cases, the BIA exerted a paternalistic kind of care
over Indian affairs. They acted as though Indians were too feeble
to administer their own affairs effectively. Their Tribes were too
small, too big, lacked infrastructure. They had not enough
education, too much dysfunction. They were unstable, emotional,
unreasonable. And so on. 93
The non-Indian agents were slowly replaced with Tribal officials, and the
U.S. attempted to “reestablish the federal-tribal trust relationship” and
“reinstated federal recognition for some tribes and, in some cases,
reestablished their reservation boundaries or took land into trust for the
tribe” in the 1970s. 94 Instead of promoting outright Tribal sovereignty, the
federal government encouraged a more cooperative federal-tribal
relationship based on the recognition of “a special government-togovernment relationship with Indian Tribes, including the right of the
Indian Tribes to self-governance.” 95 For example, Congress passed the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act of 1975,
91.
92.
93.
94.

H.R. 108, 83d Cong. (1953).
Mills, supra note 68, at 50.
TREUER, supra note 1, at 396–97.
TANA FITZPATRICK, CONG. RSCH. SERV, R46647, TRIBAL LAND
OWNERSHIP STATUSES: OVERVIEW AND SELECTED ISSUES FOR CONGRESS 8
(2021) (citing Menominee Restoration Act of 1973, Pub. L. No. 93-197, 87 Stat.
770; Siletz Indian Tribe Restoration Act of 1977, Pub. L. No. 95-195, 91 Stat.
1415; Paiute Indian Tribe of Utah Restoration Act, Pub. L. No. 96-227, 94 Stat.
317 (1980)).
95. 42 C.F.R. § 137.2(a)(2) (2021).
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allowing Tribes to enter into “self-determination” contracts with federal,
state, and other institutions for services generally performed by DOI such
as managing health care facilities and constructing irrigation systems. 96
This change in approach stemmed from the realization that “the Federal
Bureaucracy, with its centralized rules and regulations, has eroded Tribal
Self-Governance and dominates Tribal affairs.” 97
In 2005, Congress passed a law similarly aimed at granting Tribes
more sovereign control by allowing for the development of energy
resources on Tribal land with minimal oversight from the federal
government: ITEDSDA. 98 ITEDSDA was passed as part of Title V of the
Energy Policy Act of 2005 99 and was intended to address tribes’ concerns
regarding the role federal laws, regulations, and agencies were playing in
discouraging the development of energy resources on Tribal lands. 100
ITEDSDA aims to accomplish this by establishing programs to assist
Tribes in developing their energy resources, issuing loan guarantees
related to energy development on Tribal lands, and providing a
streamlined process for site lease agreements and rights-of-way for the
development of energy resources on Tribal lands. 101
Additionally, and most significantly, ITEDSDA authorizes Tribes to
enter into TERAs and take comprehensive control over the development
of energy resources on Tribal lands. 102 TERAs essentially remove the
federal government’s role as a “middleman” in energy development on
Tribal lands. 103 Unlike other statutes, ITEDSDA “authorized a shift of the
federal government’s role in the development of tribal energy resources
away from overseeing, reviewing, perhaps second-guessing, and
approving a tribe’s business judgment and negotiating skill represented in
an individual transaction.” 104

96. 25 U.S.C. § 5321.
97. 42 C.F.R. § 137.2(a)(3).
98. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act of 2005,
Pub. L. No. 109-58, tit. V, §§ 501–506, 119 Stat. 763 (codified as 25 U.S.C. §§
3501–3506).
99. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 9–31 (2018).
100. See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 4.
101. 25 U.S.C. §§ 3502–3506.
102. Id. § 3504.
103. Kathleen R. Unger, Change Is in the Wind: Self-Determination and Wind
Power Through Tribal Energy Resource Agreements, 43 LOY. L.A. L. REV. 329,
352 (2009).
104. Mills, supra note 68, at 65.
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II. ITEDSDA AND TERA FRAMEWORK
Importantly, ITEDSDA and its implementing regulations make clear
that neither ITEDSDA nor entering into a TERA “absolves the Secretary
of responsibilities to Indian Tribes under the trust relationship, treaties,
statutes, regulations, Executive Orders, agreements or other Federal
law.” 105 ITEDSDA also affirmatively commits the Secretary to fulfill the
U.S. government’s trust responsibilities if a developer breaches a
development agreement entered into pursuant to a TERA or if any such
agreement violates a TERA. 106 ITEDSDA excuses the U.S. government
from liability but only to the extent such liability arises from a TERA or a
development agreement entered into pursuant to a TERA which results
from a term “negotiated by an Indian tribe and any other party to a lease,
business agreement, or right-of-way entered into pursuant to a tribal
energy resource agreement.” 107 Thus, the trust relationship between the
federal government and the Tribes is largely maintained.
While the trust relationship is largely maintained, a TERA allows
Tribes to take energy resource development on their lands into their own
hands, rather than having to submit (and wait) for DOI to review and
approve every potential energy project on Tribal lands. 108 As Professor
Monte Mills describes: “Far more than just transaction-specific or
resource-specific terms, a TERA would instead delineate a tribe’s
authority to enter and approve their own ‘lease or business agreement for
the purpose of energy resource development on tribal land,’ subject to
certain conditions,” which would “thereby obviate the need for federal
approval of each such lease or agreement.” 109
A TERA can be submitted by any “qualified Indian tribe” 110 to the
Secretary of the Interior for purposes of allowing the Tribe to enter into
any “leases, business agreements, and rights-of-way” for the development
of energy resources on its land without the Secretary’s review or
approval. 111 TERA approval takes approximately nine months. 112 Within
60 days of receiving a TERA, the Secretary must notify the submitting
Tribe whether the TERA has been completed and identify what financial

105.
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.
111.
112.

25 C.F.R. § 224.40(b) (2021).
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(6)(C).
Id. § 3504(e)(6)(D).
See id. § 3504.
Mills, supra note 68, at 64.
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e).
Id.
See id. § 3504(e)(2)(A)(i).
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assistance, if any, is available to the Tribe in implementing its TERA. 113
The Secretary then has 271 days from the date of receipt of the TERA to
disapprove it. 114 If no action is taken, the TERA becomes effective. 115
A TERA must contain “provisions to ensure compliance with, an
environmental review process.” 116 This is likely the most significant
aspect of a TERA—both in terms of what it requires a Tribe to provide
and the National Environmental Policy Act (“NEPA”) process it is
intended to supplant. Four different requirements must be implemented in
the environmental review process. 117 The first two are entirely procedural
and essentially redundant:
(I) the public is informed of, and has reasonable opportunity to
comment on, any significant environmental impacts of the
proposed action; and
(II) the Indian tribe provides responses to relevant and substantive
public comments on any impacts described in subclause (I) before
the Indian tribe approves the lease, business agreement, or rightof-way; 118
And:
(I) the public is informed of, and has an opportunity to comment
on, the environmental impacts of the proposed action; and
(II) responses to relevant and substantive comments are provided,
before tribal approval of the lease, business agreement, or rightof-way. 119
The sole difference between the first set of requirements and the second is
that only the first applies to “significant environmental impacts” and
explicitly requires the “Indian tribe” 120 to respond to relevant and
substantive public comments—whereas the second requirement speaks in
terms of just “environmental impacts” and is less clear about who has the
113. Id. § 3504(e)(1)(B)(i)–(iii).
114. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(A)(i).
115. Id.
116. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
117. See id. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(i)–(iv).
118. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(i)(I)–(II).
119. Id.
120. It is unclear who else would be responding to the comments, but under
the plain language of the second requirement, it is at least theoretically possible
that a developer or third-party consultant could be the party responding.
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responsibility of responding to comments. 121 If a Tribe’s environmental
review process satisfies the first subset of requirements, it will almost
certainly satisfy the second subset. The third and fourth requirements of
the environmental review process are substantive in that they require the
Tribe to have “sufficient administrative and technical capability to carry
out the environmental review process” 122 and to maintain environmental
oversight of third parties’ energy development activities. 123
Although TERAs are designed to allow Tribes to independently
develop their energy resources, the federal government still holds a
minimal role via oversight. 124 Specifically, each TERA must include a
provision requiring the Secretary of DOI to perform a periodic review of
the Tribe’s energy resource development performance. 125 However, the
actions the Secretary may take subsequent to that review are fairly limited.
The Secretary, in performing the periodic review, must determine if 1) a
TERA or an energy development agreement entered into pursuant to a
TERA has been breached and 2) if the breach puts a physical trust asset in
“imminent jeopardy” before any action is taken to limit a Tribe’s energy
development rights. 126 The action taken by the Secretary must be limited
to protection of the asset in “imminent jeopardy” and only for so long as
the violation and associated conditions causing the harm remain
uncorrected. 127 For the first three years of a TERA, the periodic review is
an annual review. 128 After three years, the Secretary and the Tribe can
stipulate that the review shall only be conducted every other year. 129
In addition to the periodic review requirement, a Tribe has certain
reporting requirements under a TERA. 130 These requirements, however,
are also quite limited. A Tribe must simply submit a copy of any
development agreement entered into pursuant to the TERA and provide
documentation of any payments made in accordance with such agreement
to the Secretary. 131 Once submitted, the Secretary must provide notice and

121. Compare 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(i),
3504(e)(2)(C)(i)(ii).
122. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(iii).
123. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(iv).
124. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(D).
125. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(D)(i).
126. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(D)(ii).
127. Id.
128. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(E).
129. Id.
130. Id.§ 3504(e)(5).
131. Id. § 3504(e)(5)(A)–(B).

with

25

U.S.C.

§

356

LSU JOURNAL OF ENERGY LAW AND RESOURCES

[Vol. X

an opportunity for public comment. 132 Scholars analyzing this notice
provision have construed it—consistent with environmental statutes like
NEPA—to mean that any member of the public and not just members of
the specified Tribe may comment on the proposed TERA. 133 The
Secretary’s review of a TERA is designed to be limited to the development
activities identified in the TERA, 134 and ITEDSDA only allows the
Secretary to disapprove of a TERA on three specified grounds. 135 First, the
Secretary can disapprove a TERA or a provision thereof if it violates
federal law or an applicable treaty.136 Second, the Secretary can issue a
disapproval if the TERA does not include a provision providing for
periodic review and evaluation by the Secretary. 137 Third, the TERA can
be disapproved if it fails to address one of 13 requirements, 138 including
amendments and renewals, 139 economic return, 140 an environmental
review process, 141 public notification requirements, 142 certain
certifications, 143 and citations to relevant Tribal laws and regulations. 144
If the Secretary does decide—based on one of the above specified
grounds—to disapprove a TERA, she must, within ten days of such
disapproval, provide a detailed written explanation identifying every
reason for the disapproval and the revisions necessary to address the
reasons for the disapproval. 145 The Secretary must also provide the Tribe
an opportunity to revise and resubmit the TERA. 146 ITEDSDA’s
implementing regulations provide that a Tribe may appeal under the

132. Id. § 3504(e)(3).
133. Warner, supra note 51, at 1055 (“Although the legislative history related
to the HEARTH Act does not appear to specify who is included in the ‘public,’
the legislative history related to an almost identical clause in the Tribal Energy
Resource Agreement (‘TERA’) provisions of the Energy Policy Act of 2005
explains that the “public” includes both tribal and nontribal citizens.”).
134. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(3).
135. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
136. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i).
137. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(ii).
138. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii).
139. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(I).
140. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(II).
141. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(III).
142. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(V).
143. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(XII).
144. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(X).
145. Id. § 3504(e)(4)(A)(i)–(ii).
146. Id. § 3504(e)(4)(B).
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Administrative Procedure Act, 147 either an initial disapproval or a revised
disapproval by the Secretary. 148
In addition to the Secretary’s periodic review of a Tribe’s compliance
with its TERA, the other manner in which the federal government may
remain involved in a Tribe’s energy resource development under a TERA
is through the petition process. ITEDSDA allows an “interested party” to
petition the Secretary regarding a Tribe’s failure to comply with the terms
of its TERA. 149 However, this process is rather limited. An “interested
party” eligible to submit such a petition is a party that “has demonstrated
with substantial evidence that an interest of the person has sustained, or
will sustain, an adverse environmental impact” as a result of a Tribe’s
failure to comply with its TERA. 150 Thus, not only must there be
“substantial evidence” showing interest, but also that a Tribe has not
complied with its TERA obligations. Petitions simply disagreeing with a
Tribe’s decision to, for example, enter into a lease for a solar project on
the Tribe’s lands would not properly be before the Secretary. Additionally,
to submit such a petition, the “interested party” must first exhaust all
remedies provided under the Tribe’s laws. 151 Given that Tribes are
generally free to set up their own administrative remedies, a Tribe could
ensure that any petitions are well vetted and thoroughly responded to prior
to the petitions reaching the Secretary. Even when such a petition reaches
the Secretary, the Secretary must consult with the Tribe regarding the
allegations. 152
After a TERA takes effect, it is effective for so long as it remains
consistent with federal law, 153 it is rescinded after receipt of a petition from
a party demonstrating substantial interest and the Secretary determines a
Tribe is noncompliant with the terms of the TERA, 154 or it is voluntarily
rescinded by the Tribe in a manner consistent with applicable
regulations. 155

147.
148.
149.
150.
151.
152.
153.
154.
155.

5 U.S.C. §§ 551–559.
25 C.F.R. § 224.77 (2021).
25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7).
Id. § 3504(e)(7)(A).
Id. § 3504(e)(7)(B).
Id. § 3504(e)(7)(C)(II).
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(F).
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(F)(i).
Id. § 3504(e)(2)(F)(ii).
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III. 2018 ITEDSDA AMENDMENTS AND ASSOCIATED REGULATORY
DEVELOPMENTS
Although the option of taking energy resource development into their
own hands by adopting a TERA would on its face seem like an appealing
prospect to Tribes, no Tribe has yet adopted a TERA. There are likely a
number of reasons for this. Prior to recent years, energy development on
Tribal lands was primarily related to oil and gas drilling which could be
accomplished without significant federal interference through the Indian
Mineral Development Act. 156 However, the red tape associated with
TERAs themselves was cited by Tribes in a 2015 GAO report as two of
the three primary deterrents to the adoption of a TERA. 157 Specifically,
Tribes cited both the uncertainty regarding the TERA implementing
regulations and the complexity associated with the TERA approval
process as primary deterrents. 158 Tribes also cited concerns about whether
they would have the resources and expertise necessary to assume energy
development tasks currently carried out by the federal government. 159
In 2018, in response to both the fact that no Tribe had adopted a TERA
and the Tribal concerns identified in the 2015 GAO report, 160 Congress
passed the ITEDSDA Amendments of 2017 (the “2018 Amendments”). 161
The 2018 Amendments were aimed at facilitating “a tribe’s application for
and the Secretary of the Interior’s approval of [TERAs]” and removing
“other federal disincentives to developing tribal trust energy resources and
assist Indian tribes interested in pursuing the development of these
156. See Wyatt Swinford, Lessons Learned: Avoiding the Hardships of Tribal
Mineral Leasing in the Development of Oklahoma Tribal Wind Energy, 40 AM.
INDIAN L. REV. 99, 105 (2016) (“These changes to federal Indian leasing policy
created substantially more flexibility for tribes, as well as producers. They leave
the actual terms of the agreement to the contracting parties, specifically the tribes.
The only restriction on IMDA leases is a determination by the Secretary that the
agreement be in the best interest of the tribe or Indian.”).
157. 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 32.
158. Id.
159. Id. at 33.
160. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 3 (2017) (“More than a decade after the
passage of the Energy Policy Act of 2005, no tribe has successfully applied for
and a [sic] received a TERA. GAO cited a few reasons for this result, some of
which include uncertainty surrounding TERA regulations promulgated by the
Department of the Interior, limited tribal capacity and the costs of taking on
activities currently controlled by federal agencies, and a complex application
process.”).
161. Indian Tribal Energy Development and Self-Determination Act
Amendments of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-325, 132 Stat. 4445.
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resources consistent with the federal policy of promoting Indian selfdetermination.” 162 The 2018 Amendments also directed the Secretary to
establish new regulations to implement regulatory changes resulting from
the ITEDSDA amendments. 163
Under the 2018 Amendments, the substantive TERA requirements and
the process for approval of a TERA changed in numerous ways to address
some of the significant issues that previously deterred Tribes from entering
into a TERA. 164 These changes included: (a) a revision of the definition of
what qualified Tribes could enter into a TERA, thereby removing the
Secretary’s discretion and, in turn, providing that most Tribes were de
facto qualified; (b) a shift of the burden for seeking TERA approval from
the Tribes to requiring the Secretary affirmatively disapprove a TERA; (c)
a provision allowing Tribes to preemptively address the “inherently
Federal functions” 165 language contained in DOI’s implementing
regulations; (d) reduction of ITEDSDA’s NEPA-like environmental
review requirements and granted Tribes flexibility to administer their own
environmental review processes; (e) a streamlined TERA approval (and
amendment) process; (f) potentially limited funding assistance; and (g)
institution of the Tribal Energy Development Organizations. 166
A. Revised Definition of What Qualifies Tribes to Adopt a TERA
The 2018 Amendments included reducing a Tribe’s qualification
requirements to enter into a TERA. Prior to the 2018 Amendments,
ITEDSDA allowed the Secretary to determine whether a Tribe was
qualified to enter into a TERA based on a determination that “the Indian
tribe has demonstrated that the Indian tribe has sufficient capacity to
regulate the development of energy resources of the Indian tribe.” 167
“Sufficient capacity” was left undefined, thereby providing the Secretary
with considerable discretion in determining whether a Tribe was qualified
to enter into a TERA. ITEDSDA’s pre-2018 Amendment “tribal capacity
requirements pose[d] a significant hurdle to TERA eligibility.” 168

162. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 2. The 2018 Amendments, although
identified in the Act title as being from 2017, were not passed until December of
2018—hence the designation as 2018 Amendments. See id. at 1.
163. Id. at 9.
164. See 25 C.F.R. § 224.52 (2021); see also id. § 224.53(c)(2).
165. 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.52(c), 224.53(c)(2).
166. 25 C.F.R. § 224.201.
167. 25 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(2)(B)(i), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B)(i).
168. Mills, supra note 68, at 87.
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The 2018 Amendments minimize Secretarial discretion by outright
defining “qualified Indian tribe” to mean an Indian tribe that:
(A) carried out a contract or compact under title I or IV of the
Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act (25
U.S.C. 5301 et seq.) for a period of not less than 3 consecutive
years ending on the date on which the Indian tribe submits the
application without material audit exception (or without any
material audit exceptions that were not corrected within the 3-year
period) relating to the management of tribal land or natural
resources; or
(B) substantial experience in the administration, review, or
evaluation of energy resource leases or agreements or has
otherwise substantially participated in the administration,
management, or development of energy resources located on the
tribal land of the Indian tribe. 169
The definition provides both an entirely objective—i.e., the Tribe
carried out an Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act
contract for three years without issue—and a more subjective—i.e.,
substantial energy resource development experience—way for Tribes to
meet the statutory requirements. Most Tribes will satisfy the objective
aspect of the definition.170 However, if they do not, they can demonstrate
their energy resource development acumen rather than rely on the
Secretary’s determination of whether they have “sufficient capacity.” This
revision removes considerable uncertainty from the TERA application
process.
B. Burden Shifting for TERA Approval/Disapproval
In another substantive change, the 2018 Amendments shifted the
burden of approval from the qualified Indian Tribe to the Secretary. 171
Prior to the 2018 Amendments, ITEDSDA provided that the Secretary
would approve a TERA if the Tribe met the statutory requirements. 172 The
2018 Amendments, however, reversed this language. Rather than have the
Secretary approve a TERA if statutory requirements are met, ITEDSDA
now provides that the Secretary must disapprove of a TERA but “only if”
169. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 10–11 (2017).
170. Division of Self-Determination Services, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR, INDIAN
AFFS., https://www.bia.gov/bia/ois/dsd (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
171. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
172. Id. § 2604(e)(2)(B), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
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the TERA violates applicable federal law, does not provide for periodic
review by the Secretary, or fails to include certain specific provisions
within the TERA. 173 Moreover, and as discussed in more detail below, if
the Secretary takes no action within 270 days of receiving the TERA, the
TERA is automatically deemed approved and becomes effective. 174 While
this may appear to be a slight change in wording, the Amendment has the
effect of affirmatively placing the burden on the Secretary to disapprove a
TERA under a limited subset of reasons rather than placing the burden on
the Tribe to obtain approval.
Additionally, if the Secretary affirmatively acts to disapprove a
TERA, she now must provide a “detailed, written explanation” including
the reason for the disapproval and the revisions necessary to ensure TERA
approval. 175 The pre-2018 version of ITEDSDA only required the
Secretary to “notify the Indian tribe in writing of the basis for the
disapproval” and identify what changes would address the Secretary’s
“concerns.” 176 These revisions should help alleviate Tribal concerns that,
after fully developing a TERA, it could be disapproved based on vague or
entirely unspecified reasons. The 2018 Amendments require the Secretary
to fully articulate the reasons for any disapproval and to act to
affirmatively disapprove a TERA.
C. Option to Preemptively Address “Inherently Federal Function”
Language
The ITEDSDA implementing regulations (both before and after the
2018 Amendments and associated rulemakings) contain two unfortunate
references to “inherently Federal functions,” which have been the source
of confusion and consternation for Tribes considering the adoption of a
TERA. 177 The regulations state that a TERA may include, in addition to
other provisions related to the development of energy resources, an
“assumption by the Tribe of certain activities normally carried out by the
Department, except for inherently Federal functions.” 178 The regulations
also require a TERA to include a statement on the scope of administrative
activities a Tribe intends to carry out under its TERA, but provides that
such scope “may not include the responsibilities of the Federal

173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.

Id. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
Id.§ 3504(e)(2)(A)(i).
Id. § 3504(e)(4)(A).
Id. § 2604(e)(4)(A)–(B), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(4).
See 25 C.F.R. §§ 224.52(c), 224.53(c)(2) (2021).
25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c).
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Government under the Endangered Species Act or other inherently Federal
functions.” 179
Tribes specifically cited the following language in the 2015 GAO
Report as a deterrent to entering into TERAs. 180 The report stated that:
According to officials from one tribe we interviewed, the tribe has
repeatedly asked Interior for additional guidance on the activities
that would be considered inherently federal functions under the
regulations. Interior officials told us that the agency has not
determined what activities would be considered inherently federal
because doing so could have far-reaching implications throughout
the federal government. According to the tribal officials, without
additional guidance on inherently federal functions, tribes
considering a TERA do not know what activities the tribe would
be assuming or what efforts may be necessary to build the capacity
needed to assume those activities. Additional guidance could
include a provision of examples of activities that are not inherently
federal in the energy development context, which could assist
tribes in identifying capacity building efforts that may be
needed. 181
At the 2019 Annual Session for the National Congress of American
Indians (NCAI), the NCAI adopted a resolution calling on DOI to remove
the “inherently federal functions” language from its regulations. 182 The
resolution explained that “during consultations with tribal nations, DOI
indicated that they had not decided whether the regulations would provide
tribal nations with the authority to govern permitting procedures, such as
applications for permits to drill, stating that such authority may be deemed
an inherently federal function.” 183 The language has left Tribes confused
as to what development activities they might actually undertake pursuant
to a TERA.
While the 2018 Amendments do not remove the “inherently Federal
functions” language from the regulations and the resulting rulemaking, the
179. 25 C.F.R. § 224.53(c)(2).
180. See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 32.
181. Id.
182. See Calling on the Department of Interior to Adopt Tribal Energy Resource
Agreement Regulations that Respect Tribal Sovereignty and Self-Determination,
NAT’L CONG. AM. INDIANS, https://www.ncai.org/resources/resolutions/calling-onthe-department-of-interior-to-adopt-tribal-energy-resource-agreement-regulationsthat-respect-tribal-sovereignty-and-self-determination [https://perma.cc/YLP9-SQ
E6] (last visited Aug. 22, 2021).
183. Id.
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2018 Amendments provide an option for Tribes to clarify the definition of
“inherently Federal functions” and their respective rights and
responsibilities. 184 The 2018 Amendments allow Tribes, at their option, to
“identify which functions, if any, authorizing any operational or
development activities pursuant to a lease, right-of-way, or business
agreement approved by the Indian tribe, that the Indian tribe intends to
conduct.” 185
This new provision provides a Tribe with the option to describe and,
in turn, make clear that the activities the Tribe is conducting pursuant to
its TERA do not include “inherently Federal functions.” 186 A Tribe might
do this by simply expanding the operational functions it plans to perform
in connection with energy development. One could also imagine a Tribe
being more explicit by not only identifying the functions but identifying
them as functions that are not “inherently Federal.” A Tribe may receive
pushback from the DOI on such a provision, but it is unclear whether the
Secretary would actually have authority to disapprove of a TERA on this
ground alone, given it is not specified in any of the three reasons for
disapproval under the 2018 Amendments. 187 At a minimum, the
Secretary’s reaction to such provision would provide useful guidance as
to what an “inherently Federal function” is. Even if the Secretary issued a
disapproval, the Tribe could still revise the TERA to, at a minimum,
specify the operational functions it plans to carry out and upon receiving
approval, it would be clear that such functions were not “inherently
Federal.”
D. Reduction of NEPA-like Environmental Review Requirements
A major impediment to energy development on Tribal lands has been
that every development—because of the requirement for federal

184. 25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c).
185. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 21 (2017) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
3504(e)(2)(B)(iii)(XIII)).
186. 25 C.F.R. § 224.52(c).
187. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B). DOI might argue that the Secretary is
authorized to disapprove of the TERA on the grounds that it violates applicable
federal regulations. See 25 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(2)(B), amended by 25 U.S.C. §
3504(e)(2)(B). But ITEDSDA itself does not contain the term “inherent Federal
functions,” and DOI’s decision to reserve this authority to the Secretary is not
established in the statute. It may thus be that DOI’s regulation is ultimately in
violation of federal law.
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approval—must undergo a NEPA analysis. 188 A full NEPA analysis
currently takes an average of 4.5 years to complete. 189 The delay can stifle
energy development projects already facing tight financing timelines and
supply chain issues. A massive benefit of adopting a TERA is that
individual energy projects on Tribal land no longer require federal
approval or the accompanying arduous NEPA process. 190
ITEDSDA does still require TERAs to “include provisions to ensure
compliance with, an environmental review process.” 191 Prior to the 2018
Amendments, ITEDSDA’s “environmental review process” required “the
identification and evaluation of all significant environmental effects (as
compared to a no-action alternative),” and “the identification of proposed
mitigation measures, if any, and incorporation of appropriate mitigation
measures into the lease, business agreement, or right-of-way.” 192 NEPA
similarly requires identification of the environmental impact of the
proposed action, any adverse environmental effects which cannot be
avoided should the proposal be implemented, and alternatives to the
proposed action. 193 NEPA’s implementing regulations also require
considering “appropriate mitigation measures not already included in the
proposed action or alternatives” 194 and any “[m]eans to mitigate adverse
environmental impacts.” 195 Thus, the pre-2018 version of ITEDSDA
although not requiring a NEPA analysis conducted by the federal
government nevertheless required that Tribes perform a similar analysis
of their own.

188. See Michael Maruca, From Exploitation to Equity: Building NativeOwned Renewable Energy Generation in Indian Country, 43 WM. & MARY
ENVTL. L. & POL’Y REV. 391, 424 (2019) (“For example, in the realm of
renewable projects, federal action approving a lease triggers the NEPA
requirements, which may be lengthy.”).
189. Eli Dourado, We Need to Build Our Way Out of This Mess, N.Y. TIMES
(Aug. 11, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/2021/08/11/opinion/politics/weneed-to-build-our-way-out-of-this-mess.html
[https://perma.cc/BL7Y-F6H2]
(“To protect against community opposition, environmental impact statements
under NEPA have ballooned over the years and now take an average of four and
a half years to complete. One that was finalized in 2019 took almost 16 years.”).
190. See 25 U.S.C. § 3504(a)(2).
191. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
192. Id. § 2604(e)(2)(C)(i)–(ii), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
193. See 42 U.S.C. § 4332(C)(i)–(iii).
194. 40 C.F.R. § 1502.14(e) (2021).
195. Id. § 1502.16(a)(9).
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The 2018 Amendments do not—and rightfully should not—entirely
negate the environmental review process requirement for TERAs. 196
However, the 2018 Amendments do depart, at least in some respects, from
the NEPA-like process previously required and recognize that Tribes
require flexibility in determining how to conduct their environmental
review. 197 Specifically, under the 2018 Amendments, the requirement that
Tribes identify and evaluate “all significant environmental effects” is
replaced with the more feasible, non-binding requirement that “the public
is informed of, and has reasonable opportunity to comment on, any
significant environmental impacts of the proposed action.” 198 The revised
requirement lessens the burden on Tribes to affirmatively identify “all
significant environmental effects” and instead creates a process by which
the public becomes informed of significant effects and has the opportunity
to comment on them. 199 ITEDSDA’s burdensome requirement that Tribes
identify proposed mitigation measures has similarly been removed. 200
Under the 2018 Amendments, the Tribe is now only required to respond
to “relevant and substantive comments” it receives during the TERA
application process. 201 This too is a step back from NEPA, which requires
an agency to consider any “substantive comments timely submitted during
the public comment period.” 202
These revisions collectively provide Tribes with much more authority
and flexibility to develop their own environmental review processes and
leave the prior NEPA-like requirements to federal decision makers on nonTribal lands. Tribes can now craft their own environmental review process
that at least one scholar has argued “will enhance a tribe’s ability to make
196. Environmental review processes are slow, resource intensive, and often
do not result in better environmental outcomes. For example, the American
Petroleum Institute has recently used NEPA to argue that a pause on oil and gas
leasing on federal land violates the statute because the Bureau of Land
Management failed to undertake a NEPA review when it instituted the pause.
Complaint at 4, Am. Petrol. Inst. v. U.S. Dep’t of Interior, No. 21-cv-02506 (W.D.
La. Aug. 16, 2021). Environmental reviews on Tribal lands include important
evaluations like the identification of cultural resources that any responsible energy
development must consider, and thus, it is proper for them to remain (albeit in a
way that provides Tribes flexibility) as an aspect of Tribal energy development.
197. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
198. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 21 (2017) (codified as 25 U.S.C. §
3504(e)(2)(C)(i)(I)).
199. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C).
200. Id. § 2604(e)(2)(C)(ii), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(ii).
201. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 21 (2017) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
3504(e)(2)(C)(i)(II)).
202. 40 C.F.R. § 1503.4(a) (2021).
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the best choices concerning energy development and to continue to serve
as responsible stewards of their own lands.” 203
E. Streamlined TERA Approval Process
Prior to enactment of the 2018 Amendments, once the Secretary
received a TERA, she had a general duty to approve or disapprove of the
TERA within 270 days. 204 ITEDSDA, however, did not specify what
result would follow if the Secretary simply failed to act on the application
and the implementing regulations were similarly silent. Thus, in theory, a
TERA submitted under the pre-2018 Amendments could sit on the
Secretary’s desk indefinitely. This uncertainty combined with other
regulatory procedures contributed to an unduly “complex, confusing, and
time consuming” TERA application process. 205
The 2018 Amendments address this discrepancy by expressly
requiring the Secretary to disapprove of the TERA within 270 days.206 If
the Secretary does not disapprove of the TERA within 270 days, the TERA
automatically goes into effect. 207 In the event the Secretary requires a
Tribe to revise its TERA, the Secretary must act within 90 days to
disapprove the revised TERA, or it too goes into effect. 208 Tribes will also
know whether their application is complete within 60 days of submission
or whether more information is required. 209 The 2018 Amendments clarify
that a TERA shall remain in effect until voluntarily rescinded by the Tribe
or, after receiving a Petition from a substantially interested party 210 and
providing the Tribe an opportunity for a hearing, the Secretary rescinds
the TERA. 211 Importantly, the 2018 Amendments also allow for TERAs
to be amended without requiring a Tribe to undergo the entire TERA
application process again. 212

203. Fosland, supra note 72, at 461.
204. 25 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(2)(A), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(A).
205. 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 33.
206. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 8 (2017) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
3504(e)(2)(A)(i)).
207. Id.
208. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(A)(ii).
209. Id. § 3504(e)(1)(B).
210. As discussed in Part II, under the 2018 Amendments, the “interested
party” must have demonstrated as much to the Secretary with substantial evidence
under 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(7)(A). See discussion supra Part II.
211. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(F).
212. Id. § 3504(e)(8)(A)(iii).
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F. New TERA Administration Funding Assistance
According to the 2015 GAO Report, a major reason why Tribes were
hesitant to adopt TERAs was the lack of funding associated with
administering energy development on Tribal lands, particularly since such
development is currently administered by the federal government at no
cost to the Tribe. 213 The 2015 GAO Report indicated that “[s]everal tribal
officials we interviewed told us that the tribe does not have the resources
to assume additional responsibility and liability from the federal
government without some associated support from the federal government
to cover expenses for taking over activities currently conducted by federal
agencies.” 214 Although the 2018 Amendments do not fully address a
Tribe’s costs associated with administering a TERA, they do provide an
opportunity for Tribes to receive some degree of federal financial
assistance. The 2018 Amendments provide that:
Any amounts that the Secretary would otherwise expend to
operate or carry out any program, function, service, or activity (or
any portion of a program, function, service, or activity) of the
Department that, as a result of an Indian tribe carrying out
activities under a tribal energy resource agreement, the Secretary
does not expend, the Secretary shall, at the request of the Indian
tribe, make available to the Indian tribe in accordance with this
subsection. 215
To have access to these funds, the Tribe must enter into a funding
agreement with DOI. 216 The funding agreement, however, is separate from
the TERA, and any issues arising from the agreement will not affect the
TERA’s validity. 217 ITEDSDA also specifies that the delays associated
with the funding agreement (or regulation related thereto) cannot delay the
processing or effective date of a TERA. 218

213. 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 33.
214. Id.
215. H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 27 (2017) (codified at 25 U.S.C. §
3504(g)(1).
216. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(g)(2).
217. Id.
218. Id. § 3504(g)(3)(B).
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G. Creation of Tribal Energy Development Organizations
One noteworthy revision contained in the 2018 Amendments was the
creation of Tribal Energy Development Organizations (“TEDO”).219
Although the Secretary has yet to certify a TEDO, Tribes could use the
TEDO structure to enter into public-private partnerships with entities that
have expertise in specific areas of energy development—such as a
partnership with a solar or wind developer.
A TEDO is defined as either a single organization engaged in the
development of energy resources wholly owned by a Tribe or an
organization composed of two or more entities, at least one of which is a
Tribe, that has consent of all participating Tribes to enter into an energy
resource development agreement under ITEDSDA. 220 A TEDO must
further be certified as such by the Secretary. 221 To obtain certification, the
Tribal entity within the TEDO must have carried out a contract pursuant
to the Indian Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act 222 that
included programs relating to the management of Tribal land without
uncorrected audit exceptions within the last three years. 223 The TEDO
must be organized under the laws of the Tribe, and several requirements
are in place to ensure the Tribe maintains significant control over the
TEDO. 224 Specifically, the Tribe must hold a majority interest in the
TEDO, the TEDO’s organizing documents must specify that the Tribe
whose land is being developed has a controlling interest at all times, and
the TEDO must be subject to the jurisdiction, laws, and authority of the
Tribe. 225 Once a proposed certification is submitted, the Secretary has 90
days to approve or disapprove the TEDO application 226 and, if approved,
must issue a certification within ten days.227
IV. THE TIME IS NOW FOR ADOPTING A TERA
As of the time of this writing, no Tribe has taken advantage of the
2018 Amendments or entered into a TERA. Taking back control of energy
219. See H.R. REP. NO. 115-1057, pt. 1, at 27–28 (2017) (codified at 25 U.S.C.
§ 3504(h).
220. 25 U.S.C. § 3501(12).
221. Id. § 3504(h)(1).
222. See discussion supra Parts I, II.
223. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(h)(2)(A).
224. Id. § 3504(h)(2)(B)(i).
225. Id.§ 3504(h)(2)(B).
226. Id. § 3504(h)(1).
227. Id. § 3504(h)(3).
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resources is undoubtedly a sizable task, and the process of adopting a
TERA alone is significant. The decision to adopt a TERA is one that
Tribes cannot take lightly, but “TERAs should be seen for what they are:
the best option for tribes who want to maximize their control over the
development of tribal energy resources.” 228 Given the 2018 Amendments
and the Tribes’ demonstrated capacity to effectively manage the worst
pandemic in a century, there is no merit to an argument that Tribes do not
possess the capability to adopt and implement a TERA.
A. Significance of the 2018 Amendments
Although the 2018 Amendments do not entirely remove the barriers
to TERA adoption and do still impose an array of difficult requirements
on Tribes, the Amendments allow for significant improvements to the
TERA application process and substantive requirements that cannot be
dismissed. Tribes no longer hold any reasonable uncertainty regarding
whether the Secretary will find “sufficient capacity” to enter into a
TERA. 229 If a Tribe has carried out an Indian Self-Determination and
Education Assistance Act contract—which most have 230—the Tribe will
be eligible to enter into a TERA. 231 Even if a Tribe does not have an Indian
Self-Determination and Education Assistance Act contract (or does have
one but has had uncorrected material audit exceptions to it), the Tribe can
still enter into a TERA if it can demonstrate substantial energy resource
experience. 232 Not every Tribe will be a “qualified Indian tribe,” but most
will. When Tribes submit their TERAs to the Secretary, they now know
the burden is on the Secretary to disapprove of the TERA within 270 days
if the TERA violates applicable federal law, fails to provide for periodic
review by the Secretary, or does not include certain requisite provisions
within the TERA. 233
The 2018 Amendments also provide Tribes with considerable
flexibility in several important respects. Tribes can now preemptively
address the confusing “inherently Federal functions” language contained
in DOI’s implementing regulations. 234 Rather than having to implement an
environmental review process mirroring NEPA, Tribes can now set up a
process tailored to their members that is focused on ensuring the public is
228.
229.
230.
231.
232.
233.
234.

Fosland, supra note 72, at 454.
25 U.S.C. § 2604(e)(2)(B)(i), amended by 25 U.S.C. § 3504(e)(2)(B).
See Division of Self-Determination Services, supra note 170.
25 U.S.C. § 3501(9)(A).
Id. § 3501(9)(B).
Id. § 2604(e)(2)(B).
See id. § 2604(e)(2)(B)(iii)(XIII).
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informed and has an opportunity to comment on significant environmental
impacts. 235 Further, the TERA approval process is now clear: DOI must
adhere to a 270-day timeline, 236 and it must update the Tribe within 60
days regarding the application’s status.237 The 2018 Amendments and
implementing TERA regulations certainly do not address all of the hurdles
to renewable energy development on Tribal lands, but they do pave the
way towards empowering Tribes to more independently develop their
renewable energy resources.
Finally, the 2018 Amendments create new funding mechanisms and
vehicles Tribes can use to implement their own energy resource
management 238 and develop the resources themselves. 239 If fully utilized
with other federal programs, a Tribe could take advantage of these
provisions to transition from not only being a leaseholder of major
renewable energy developments, but also a developer of such projects. The
2018 Amendments provide that a Tribe can receive the funds associated
with the federal government carrying out energy resource development on
the Tribe’s lands. 240 Other federal programs—such as the $2 billion in
available funds under the Tribal Energy Loan Guarantee Program that
provides for up to 90% of an energy development project occurring on
Tribal land 241—could be further leveraged to provide Tribes with the
funding to develop their own renewable energy projects. Additionally, if
Congress moves forward with the “direct pay” renewable energy tax credit
options currently included in many of the major infrastructure bills, Tribes

235. See id. § 3504(e)(2)(C)(i)(I).
236. Id. § 3504(e)(2)(A)(i).
237. Id. § 3504(e)(1)(B).
238. Id. § 3504(g)(1).
239. Id. § 3504(h).
240. Id. § 3504(g).
241. Michelle Lewis, The US Energy Department Wants to Loan $43B for EV
and Clean Energy Projects, ELECTREK (Mar. 26, 2021, 11:15 AM),
https://electrek.co/2021/03/26/us-energy-department-43-billion-loan-programsoffice/ [https://perma.cc/8S5P-CM5Q] (explaining that the Department of
Energy’s Loan Program Office Director has said the Office is evaluating changes
to its process including (i) deferring fees until a loan closes; (ii) streamlining the
application process; (iii) reducing time and costs associated with smaller projects;
and (iv) reexamining how the program defines eligible borrowers and projects);
LPO Director Jigar Shah Delivers Remarks at Reservation Economic Summit
2021, ENERGY.GOV (July 20, 2021), https://www.energy.gov/lpo/articles/lpodirector-jigar-shah-delivers-remarks-reservation-economic-summit-2021
[https://perma.cc/8CFM-RP72].
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could partner with private developers in a TEDO to directly share in the
benefits from energy development on their lands. 242
B. Other Federal Frameworks Fail to Provide for Comprehensive Tribal
Management of Renewable Energy Resources
Renewable energy development on Tribal land currently occurs either
by the developer entering into an agreement with the Tribe and then having
that agreement approved by DOI 243 or pursuant to Tribal regulations
“consistent with” DOI’s regulations under the HEARTH Act. 244 As
detailed in the Introduction of this Article, the problem with developing
renewable projects pursuant to DOI’s approval is it often takes DOI far too
long to issue an approval, 245 rendering Tribal energy resources less
attractive than those located on non-Tribal lands. As one scholar has noted:
“This instrument-by-instrument approval process introduces both delay
and potential federal override of tribal decisions.” 246 Such approval also
triggers a NEPA review 247 which, in turn, typically results in
242. Hannah Hawkins et al., KPMG Report: Outlook for What’s Ahead for
Energy Tax Incentives (Updated), KPMG (May 3, 2021), https://home.kpmg
/us/en/home/insights/2021/05/tnf-kpmg-report-outlook-whats-head-energy-taxincentives-updated.html [https://perma.cc/BZR6-LBTB]. Tribes are currently
unable to take advantage of renewable energy tax credits because “tribal
governments are sovereign entities, they are not subject to federal taxation, and
therefore do not qualify for federal tax breaks. Thus, any renewable energy project
owned by the tribal government does not qualify for either the PTC or the ITC.”
Ravotti, supra note 70, at 303.
243. See, e.g., Interior Department Advances Two Solar Energy Projects on
Tribal Lands, U.S. DEP’T INTERIOR (July 16, 2021), https://www.doi.gov/press
releases/interior-department-advances-two-solar-energy-projects-tribal-lands
[https://perma.cc/HXJ9-B3ZK].
244. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h); see also About the SEIS, ARROW CANYON SOLAR
PROJECT SUPPLEMENTAL ENV’T IMPACT STATEMENT, https://www.arrow
canyonsolarseis.com/about-the-seis.html [https://perma.cc/CWT9-WS9E] (last
visited Aug. 22, 2021) (“The proposed Federal action, taken under 25 U.S.C. §
415, is BIA’s approval of the expansion of an approved 850-acre solar energy
ground lease to 2,200 acres entered into by the Moapa Band with Arrow Canyon
Solar, LLC (Applicant), a subsidiary of EDF Renewables (EDFR).”).
245. See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25, at 22 (“In another example, in
2014, the Acting Chairman for the Southern Ute Indian Tribe reported that BIA’s
review of some of its energy-related documents took as long as 8 years.”).
246. Judith V. Royster, Tribal Energy Development: Renewables and the
Problem of the Current Statutory Structures, 31 STAN. ENVTL. L.J. 91, 113 (2012).
247. Bosshardt et al., supra note 66 (“The House Natural Resources
Committee report on the legislation reflects impatience with the National
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environmental impact statements that “are notoriously time-consuming
and expensive to assemble and often fail to result in any substantive
changes to the action under review.” 248
The HEARTH Act presents an increasingly popular alternative to
administration of Tribal energy resources by DOI. As of the writing of this
Article, 55 out of the 574 federally recognized Tribes had their own
regulations approved by DOI allowing them to govern—albeit to varying
extents—the development of their own energy resources. 249 Under these
regulations, NEPA is generally not triggered, resulting in a more
streamlined process. 250 Nevertheless, because the “HEARTH Act requires
tribes interested in renewable energy development to potentially
incorporate aspects of federal environmental law,” including provisions
consistent with NEPA, it “undermines tribal sovereignty.” 251
The HEARTH Act’s framework has other significant drawbacks.
Chief among them is the requirement that the regulations adopted by a
Tribe be “consistent with any regulations issued by the Secretary . . .
(including any amendments to the subsection or regulations).” 252 Although
it is beyond the scope of this Article to survey those regulations, they are
voluminous 253 and certainly far more extensive than the requirements for
adopting a TERA. 254 The Tribal regulations also do not remove the need
for environmental review; rather, a Tribe’s regulations must include “an
environmental review process that includes . . . the identification and
evaluation of any significant effects of the proposed action on the
environment” and ensure that “the public is informed of, and has a
reasonable opportunity to comment on, any significant environmental
impacts of the proposed action.” 255
Environmental Policy Act in particular, noting that if secretarial approval triggers
NEPA, ‘then a full environmental impact statement under [NEPA] must first
occur, along with the usual delays and the opportunity for any group to file a
lawsuit over the sufficiency of the environmental review.’”).
248. Bronin, supra note 71, at 231.
249. HEARTH Act of 2012, supra note 66.
250. Bosshardt et al., supra note 66 (“The primary advantage of working with
a tribe with a HEARTH Act approved leasing regulation is the streamlined
approval process. Other federal, state and local authorizations may still be
required, with attendant environmental reviews, but what otherwise would be a
key permitting step—BIA approval of the lease—will not be required.”).
251. Warner, supra note 51, at 1053.
252. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h)(3)(B)(i).
253. See generally 25 C.F.R. pt. 162 (2021).
254. Compare 25 C.F.R. pt.162, with 25 C.F.R. § 224.53.
255. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h)(3)(B).
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Apart from these issues, the overarching problem with the HEARTH
Act’s approach to Tribal energy development is that it does not truly
provide Tribes the sovereign right to develop their energy resources in the
manner most appropriate for them. While a Tribe can approve certain
energy lease agreements under the HEARTH Act, it is limited to
agreements DOI’s regulations actually address, and therefore “off-lease
components, such as transmission lines, and the overall time to secure all
necessary authorizations may ultimately depend on other regulatory
requirements, including state and local approvals subject to state
environmental review requirements.” 256 In short, the HEARTH Act is “not
comprehensive authority to pursue an energy development project or
approve rights of way, which are often necessary for transmission and
distribution wires.” 257
Similarly troubling is the fact that a Tribe’s regulations must remain
consistent with DOI’s regulations—including any amendments—and
thus, if the Secretary revises DOI’s leasing regulations, a Tribe may need
to expend resources to amend its HEARTH Act regulations and resubmit
them for DOI approval. A Tribe could also have its regulations and ability
to approve energy development on its lands rescinded by the Secretary, 258
and no funding is available like that under ITEDSDA. 259
C. Tribes Are Prepared to Develop Their Own Energy Resources
Despite historic inequities and a lack of federal resources, Tribes have
remarkably battled the worst pandemic in a century.260 The Cherokee
Nation, with the help of mask mandates, free drive-through Covid-19
testing, and other measures, had just 4,000 cases and 33 Covid-19 related

256. Bosshardt et al., supra note 66.
257. Maruca, supra note 188, at 480–81.
258. 25 U.S.C. § 415(h)(8)(B); 25 C.F.R. § 162.022; Bosshardt et al., supra
note 66 (“The secretary may take ‘any action the Secretary determines to be
necessary to remedy the violation’ of the tribe's HEARTH Act regulations,
including rescinding approval of the regulations and reassuming responsibility for
approving leases.”).
259. 25 U.S.C. § 3504(g).
260. See Kelsey Piper, Here’s How Covid-19 Ranks Among the Worst Plagues
in History, VOX (Jan. 11, 2021, 2:30 PM), https://www.vox.com/futureperfect/21539483/covid-19-black-death-plagues-in-history
(“Covid-19,
of
course, has now been certified as the cause of death for 1.94 million people in the
space of one year. That makes it worse in absolute terms than most influenza
pandemics in history, except 1918’s . . . .”).
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deaths of nearly 140,000 citizens nine months into the pandemic. 261 The
Northern Cheyenne Tribe undertook testing of half of its 4,000 members
in July and “quickly quarantined the handful who tested positive, creating
shelters for those who couldn’t do so in their homes.” 262 Tribes on the Fort
Belknap reservation have overseen the vaccination of 67% of Tribal
members, compared to the neighboring county where the rate hangs
around just 40%. 263 The Navajo Nation—which by April 2021 had given
at least one Covid-19 dose to 87.8% of its eligible population 264—had
succeeded in vaccinating 4,000 to 5,000 homebound citizens “by
collaborating with public health workers to reach those residents in rural
communities.” 265
In her review of the Tribal response to the Covid-19 pandemic,
Professor Katherine Foley, identified three qualities that characterized
strong Tribal responses: “Most of these tribes acted quickly, embraced
expertise while tailoring measures to specific community qualities and
needs, and engaged in necessary innovation.” 266 With respect to their
quick action, she explained: “Tribes were early adopters of curfews, stayat-home orders, and mask mandates—adopting such policies often well

261. Usha Lee McFarling, ‘They’ve Been Following the Science’: How the
Covid-19 Pandemic Has Been Curtailed in Cherokee Nation, STAT (Nov. 17,
2020), https://www.statnews.com/2020/11/17/how-covid19-has-been-curtailedin-cherokee-nation/ [https://perma.cc/5AD7-493A].
262. Martha Hostetter & Sarah Klein, Learning from Pandemic Responses
Across Indian Country, COMMONWEALTH FUND (Sept. 30, 2020), https://
www.commonwealthfund.org/publications/2020/sep/learning-pandemic-respons
es-across-indian-country [https://perma.cc/9DJ6-6UJX].
263. Richard Read, Despite Obstacles, Native Americans Have the Nation’s
Highest COVID-19 Vaccination Rate, L.A. TIMES (Aug. 12, 2021, 3:00 AM),
https://www.latimes.com/world-nation/story/2021-08-12/native-american-covid19-vaccination.
264. Rachel Treisman, Outpacing The U.S., Hard-Hit Navajo Nation Has
Vaccinated More Than Half of Adults, NPR (Apr. 26, 2021, 2:51 PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/coronavirus-liveupdates/2021/04/26/990884991/outpacing-the-u-s-hard-hit-navajo-nation-hasvaccinated-more-than-half-of-adults [https://perma.cc/RTH7-452D].
265. Latoya Hill & Samantha Artiga, COVID-19 Vaccination Among
American Indian and Alaska Native People, KFF (Apr. 9, 2021), https://
www.kff.org/racial-equity-and-health-policy/issue-brief/covid-19-vaccinationamerican-indian-alaska-native-people/ [https://perma.cc/4DZY-DPY8].
266. Katherine Florey, The Tribal COVID-19 Response, REGUL. REV. (Mar.
17, 2021), https://www.theregreview.org/2021/03/17/florey-tribal-covid-19response/ [https://perma.cc/F522-JZSG].
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before the states in which they were located took similar actions.” 267
Tribes utilized expert health advice by, for example, “including a system
of color-coded window signs that a tribal public health agency in Maine
devised to allow elders to seek help without leaving home.” 268 Further,
Tribes maintained innovation throughout the pandemic, introducing
Covid-19 testing checkpoints upon entry to their reservations, deploying
“charter planes, sleds, and a water taxi” to get Tribal members vaccinated
and toggling between federal and state partnerships to obtain vaccine
supplies quicker. 269
Tribes can similarly employ these three attributes to more effectively
develop their own energy resources by adopting a TERA. Tribes are
currently prevented by the federal government and the labyrinth of
associated processes from swiftly moving to develop their energy
resources. A TERA, however, would allow Tribes to develop energy
resources at a much quicker and more efficient pace. Developers and
financing parties will often have multiple site locations and projects from
which they can choose to invest their time and energy. If a Tribe can offer
them an expedited process they cannot get—say on adjacent federal or
state land—they will be more likely to choose the project on Tribal land,
and the benefits associated with the project will flow to the Tribe. On the
other hand, if a Tribe elects to take a more drawn-out approach to
developing their energy resources, a TERA will allow for that as well.
A TERA will also allow Tribes to take in (or develop their own)
energy expertise and adapt it to meet energy development goals specific
to that Tribe. To begin with, there are already American-Indian-led
organizations like Grid Alternatives 270 (which helps Tribal communities
meet their renewable energy goals) or Native Renewables 271 (founded by
Wahleah Johns and aimed at providing off grid photovoltaic systems to
homes on the Navajo and Hopi reservations) that have energy
development expertise that can be called upon to assist Tribes in
developing their own energy resources under a TERA. Even if Tribes rely
on non-American-Indian energy expertise, a TERA will allow them to
adapt that expertise to meet their Tribe’s energy development goals.

267. Id.
268. Id.
269. Id.
270. See Tribal Program, GRID ALTS., https://gridalternatives.org/what-wedo/tribal-program [https://perma.cc/5KFU-3MB2] (last visited Oct. 31, 2021).
271. Empowering Native Communities, NATIVE RENEWABLES, https://
www.nativerenewables.org/ [https://perma.cc/BMY7-GC6Q] (last visited Oct.
31, 2021).
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Whether this is requiring that solar developments be pollinator friendly, 272
that wind projects employ bird safe technologies, 273 or something else
entirely, will be almost entirely up to Tribes under their TERA.
Finally, as the energy landscape in the world shifts to accommodate
climate change, continuing innovation both on and off Tribal lands will
play a vital role. During the pandemic, Tribes have “pioneered novel
measures to combat COVID-19, developing new and creative solutions to
urgent problems, including some of the few successful border control
programs in the United States.” 274 Responsible renewable energy
development will present different challenges than navigating a pandemic.
However, by adopting a TERA, Tribes will be in a position to innovate
how energy is developed on their lands in the same manner they innovated
to protect their communities from the Covid-19 pandemic. TERAs thus
offer the opportunity to dream a new dream of sovereign renewable energy
development on Tribal lands.
CONCLUSION
Tribes throughout the country have demonstrated that when the
federal government left them stranded without proper resources to respond
to the Covid-19 pandemic, 275 they could and did take the steps necessary
to protect their members. 276 The federal government has similarly failed
to take the steps necessary to help Tribes develop their renewable energy
resources, 277 and the federal government’s role in developing fossil fuel
resources has, as Wahleah Johns writes, created “a system in which
corporations could make billions pillaging our homelands for uranium,
272. Abby Neal & Uma Atre, Pollinator-Friendly Solar Installations Benefit
Wildlife, Farmers, Climate, ENV’T & ENERGY STUDY INST. (Mar. 16, 2020),
https://www.eesi.org/articles/view/pollinator-friendly-solar-installations-benefitwildlife-farmers-climate [https://perma.cc/48JQ-VWKZ].
273. Molly Bennet, How New Technology Is Making Wind Farms Safer for
Birds, AUDUBON (2018), https://www.audubon.org/magazine/spring-2018/hownew-technology-making-wind-farms-safer-birds [https://perma.cc/9GLD-NSDQ].
274. Florey, supra note 266.
275. Mark Walker & Emily Cochrane, Native American Tribes Sue Treasury
Over Stimulus Aid as They Feud Over Funding, N.Y. TIMES (June 25, 2021),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/05/01/us/politics/coronavirus-native-americantribes-treasury-stimulus.html [https://perma.cc/9SP6-8D2M].
276. Bart Pfankuch, How a S.D. Native American Tribe Is Protecting Its
People from COVID-19, ARGUS LEADER (May 20, 2020, 4:52 PM), https://
www.argusleader.com/story/news/2020/05/20/how-s-d-native-american-tribe-pr
otecting-its-people-covid-19/5232458002/ [https://perma.cc/GV5N-4VWV].
277. See 2015 GAO REPORT, supra note 25.
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coal, oil and gas deposits, leaving our groundwater contaminated and our
people sickened with uranium radiation exposure, lung disease, asthma
and cancer.” 278 Given the U.S. government’s past record, now is the time
for Tribes to develop their own renewable energy resources. A productive
first step would be to take back control over those resources by adopting a
TERA.

278. Johns, supra note 51.

